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COMMENTARY
SCIENTISTS URGE DHS TO IMPROVE BIOTERRORISM
RISK ASSESSMENT
Gregory S. Parnell, Luciana L. Borio, Gerald G. Brown, David Banks, and Alyson G. Wilson
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) completed its first Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA), in-
tended to be the foundation for DHS’s subsequent biennial risk assessments mandated by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 10 (HSPD-10). At the request of DHS, the National Research Council established the Committee on Method-
ological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Agent Risk Analysis to provide an indepen-
dent, scientific peer review of the BTRA. The Committee found a number of shortcomings in the BTRA, including a fail-
ure to consider terrorists as intelligent adversaries in their models, unnecessary complexity in threat and consequence
modeling and simulations, and a lack of focus on risk management. The Committee unanimously concluded that an im-
proved BTRA is needed to provide a more credible foundation for risk-informed decision making.
“The threat posed by biological agents employed in a terrorist attack on the United States is arguably the most important
homeland security challenge of our era. Whether natural pathogens are cultured or new variants are bioengineered, the
consequence of a terrorist-induced pandemic could be millions of casualties—far more than we would expect from nuclear
terrorism, chemical attacks, or conventional attacks on the infrastructure of the United States such as the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Even if there were fewer casualties, additional second-order consequences (including psychological, social,
and economic effects) would dramatically compound the effects. Bioengineering is no longer the exclusive purview of state
sponsors of terrorism; this technology is now available to small terrorist groups and even to deranged individuals.”
—Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Threat Risk Assessment: 
A Call for Change, National Research Council, 2008
1
DHS’S FIRST BIOLOGICAL THREAT
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment (the quantification of risk) is the founda-
tional element of risk analysis, which also includes risk
communication (the provision of information about risks)
and risk management (strategies for reducing future
losses).1-3 Quantifying risk is the prerequisite for effective
risk communication to policymakers and stakeholders, and
for supporting critical risk management decisions by all lev-
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els of government and the private sector. Because it is not
possible to fully protect every target and community against
every potential threat, we need to identify the greatest risks
and take the most efficient steps to reduce them.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-
10): Biodefense for the 21st Century,4 issued in April 2004,
states that “[b]iological weapons in the possession of hostile
states or terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the
safety and security of the United States and our allies” and
charges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with
issuing biennial assessments of biological threats, to “guide
prioritization of our on-going investments in biodefense-re-
lated research, development, planning, and preparedness.”4
The subsequent Homeland Security Presidential Directive
18 (HSPD-18): Medical Countermeasures against
Weapons of Mass Destruction5 calls for an integrated risk
assessment of all chemical, biological, radiological, and nu-
clear (CBRN) threats.
In 2006, DHS completed its first risk assessment and
published Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA).6 The work
was contracted to Battelle Memorial Institute in Colum-
bus, Ohio. The BTRA report resulted from a complex fed-
eration of integrated computer-based models to estimate
the risks associated with the intentional terrorist release of
each of 27 natural pathogens7 and one engineered agent
(multidrug resistant Bacillus anthracis). The BTRA ranks
each pathogen according to its level of risk, based on sub-
jective event probabilities and their consequences. The sub-
jective event probabilities were elicited from dozens of 
biological weapons experts. Event consequences were esti-
mated from a number of different models and simulations.
For example, to estimate the spread and health effects of in-
fectious diseases, “susceptible, exposed, infected, and re-
moved” (SEIR) mathematical models for the relevant dis-
eases were employed (see Bailey8 for a comprehensive
treatment).
DHS promotes the BTRA of 2006 as an “end-to-end risk
assessment of the bioterrorism threat,” ranking various
agents by their level of risk, to “assist and guide biodefense
strategic planning.”6 The intent of BTRA is that it could be
used to identify vulnerabilities to particular agents or sce-
narios, or to prioritize federal investment in particular
countermeasures. Moreover, the BTRA methodology is in-
tended to be the foundation for future biennial risk assess-
ments by DHS and perhaps to be applied to other areas
such as chemical or nuclear terrorism, fulfilling DHS’s
obligations to HSPD-10 and HSPD-18.
NRC COMMITTEE FINDS SERIOUS
LIMITATIONS WITH DHS’S BTRA
At the request of DHS, the National Research Council es-
tablished the Committee on Methodological Improve-
ments to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biologi-
cal Agent Risk Analysis to provide an independent, scien-
tific peer review of the BTRA. The Committee reviewed all
of the details in the BTRA of 2006, interviewed its leaders
and its implementers, held discussions with other experts
who had not themselves participated in the BTRA, and re-
ceived briefings from DHS on planned improvements to
the subsequent BTRA of 2008. In accord with HSPD-10,
the Committee reviewed not only the mathematical foun-
dation of the BTRA, but also its potential utility to policy-
makers.
The NRC Committee’s review was limited to the initial
BTRA of 2006 because the Committee’s deliberations
ended before the BTRA of 2008 report was released. Al-
though the updated BTRA of 2008 included a number of
additions and refinements to the BTRA of 2006, none of
the changes would alter the Committee’s assessment of the
BTRA methodology or render the Committee’s findings ir-
relevant.
The Committee identified a number of fundamental
problems with the BTRA, ranging from the use of unneces-
sarily complicated probability models, to simplistic as-
sumptions regarding the manner in which terrorist behav-
ior should be modeled.9 The Committee also unanimously
judged the BTRA unsuitable for risk management. In their
final report, the Committee made detailed recommenda-
tions as to ways DHS could remediate the BTRA’s many
shortcomings.
DHS Failed to Adequately Model 
the Behavior of Terrorists as 
Intelligent Adversaries
Fortunately, bioterrorism attacks have been so infrequent
that we have limited data on which to draw. However, as
9/11 demonstrated, terrorists will certainly design their at-
tacks to exploit our vulnerabilities and attempt to achieve
consequences that will meet their objectives. Therefore,
homeland security risk analysts must consider the potential
decisions of terrorists as if they were intelligent adversaries.
However, the BTRA does not consider the range of pos-
sible attack strategies that an intelligent adversary might
pursue. Instead, the BTRA uses an event tree, representing
many hypothetical sequences of events, from the terrorist
decision to initiate an attack to the consequences of the at-
tack. It represents terrorist decisions by means of probabili-
ties assessed by experts as they would assess the probability
of a natural hazard (eg, an earthquake) or an engineered
system failure (eg, a nuclear reactor). For example, in the
BTRA experts assign subjective probabilities for terrorists
selecting a target, selecting a pathogen, acquiring the patho-
gen, etc. Each of these events is associated with a very small
probability. To assess the expected consequences of each
scenario, the assigned small probability of each event must
SCIENTISTS URGE DHS TO IMPROVE BIOTERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
2 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
be multiplied for every event in the scenario. This yields a
small number, minimizing the true consequences of each
threat.
An analogy to the events of 9/11 might be useful here. If
the BTRA were to be used to characterize the threat of
9/11, experts would have assigned probabilities for Al-
Qaeda to choose the World Trade Center towers as the tar-
get and planes as the weapon. These small probabilities,
when multiplied by the number of deaths caused by such
an attack, would have resulted in a very small number, and
the risk of such attack would have been deemed insignifi-
cant. However, terrorists, our intelligent adversaries, did
not assign probabilities to each of their choices. Terrorists
are goal-oriented, resourceful adversaries, who will, given
the constraints they perceive, select the best agent and tar-
get to achieve their objectives.
The Complexity of the DHS
Consequence Models Is Not Supported
by Existing Knowledge
The Committee closely examined the assumptions and the
mathematical details of the BTRA and found weaknesses in
model conception and unnecessary complexity throughout,
along with errors in enough of the underlying mathematics
and statistics that the Committee was compelled to express
significant concern.
Examples of unnecessary complexity include the large
number of events in each tree and the overly elaborate algo-
rithm with which outcome probabilities are calculated. Ad-
ditionally, the SEIR models used to analyze the health con-
sequences of various attack scenarios require input
parameter values for which empirical data do not exist. Be-
cause the granularity of detail in the SEIR models cannot
be supported by existing clinical and epidemiologic data for
any pathogen on the BTRA list—not even B. anthracis—
many broad assumptions are required. This results in an il-
lusion regarding the precision of the results when there is
none.
BTRA Does Not Focus on 
Risk Management
Risk assessment requires an estimate of the threat (based on
the intentions and capabilities of adversaries) and the ex-
pected magnitude of consequences (eg, deaths, illnesses,
and economic losses) given our vulnerabilities. Alone, com-
plex biennial risk assessments, such as the BTRA, have no
direct impact on risk reduction. In addition, the risk has to
be communicated to the stakeholders and policymakers. In
the end, only effective risk management strategies can re-
duce risk.
However, the current versions of the BTRA present sig-
nificant barriers to stakeholders who should be using the
BTRA for risk management. The tool’s construction and
assumptions are not transparent, the interface is not user-
friendly, and the tool does not easily allow modeling of al-
ternative scenarios and evaluation of various risk manage-
ment strategies. Given the large number of homeland
security stakeholders who influence the vulnerabilities and,
as a result, the consequences of a biological attack, it is crit-
ically important that DHS revise its tool so that these stake-
holders can assess the potential effects of their risk manage-
ment strategies.
THE CALL FOR CHANGE
The threat of bioterrorism is significant; various pathogens
could cause unprecedented harm to the health and prosper-
ity of Americans, and the technical barriers to launching ef-
fective biological attacks are not insuperable, even for small
groups or individuals. Thus, the objectives of the BTRA are
essential and laudable. But given the defects in the BTRA’s
underlying model and user interface, the Committee con-
cluded that the current incarnation of the BTRA is inade-
quate, does not satisfy the intent of HSPD-10, and should
not be used as the foundation for future biennial risk assess-
ments or expanded to an integrated risk assessment of
CBRN threats. The Committee unanimously believes that
an improved BTRA is needed to provide a credible founda-
tion for risk-informed decision making.
WHAT DHS SHOULD DO
A flawed probabilistic risk assessment tool is inadequate to
communicate risk and to support risk management deci-
sions. The risk of a bioterrorism attack requires the best ef-
forts of our homeland security community. The authors be-
lieve that DHS should take 3 near-term actions to make the
necessary changes to BTRA:
1. Form an independent senior technical review panel to
advise the DHS risk analysis team leaders. The DHS
risk assessment is a critical challenge that requires exper-
tise in many technical disciplines (including risk analy-
sis, biology, epidemiology, statistics, operations re-
search, social science, and economics) to develop
credible and responsive risk assessment models. The se-
nior review panel should guide the risk analysis team in
the implementation of the required changes described in
the NRC report and review the BTRA output. Further,
this review panel should communicate to government
leaders and stakeholders DHS’s progress in revising the
BTRA.
2. Obtain robust stakeholder input and feedback. DHS
must meaningfully engage with stakeholders and incor-
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porate their feedback into the BTRA. Many in govern-
ment and public and private organizations need to par-
ticipate in the bioterrorism risk assessment to under-
stand their vulnerabilities, the potential consequences of
attack, and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
The results of the assessments should directly inform
their risk management decisions.
3. Develop and incorporate risk analysis techniques that
model terrorists as intelligent adversaries. The NRC
report proposed 3 possible techniques to assess the im-
pact of an intelligent adversary. What these techniques
share is that instead of requiring the analyst to input
probabilities of what the terrorist is likely to do, they in-
stead output the terrorist actions that will best achieve
the terrorists’ objectives. The 3 techniques include: (1) a
“bioterrorism decision model” to model terrorist actions
and U.S. strategic actions as decisions, and agent acqui-
sition, employment, vulnerabilities, consequences, and
mitigation events as uncertain events using available off-
the-shelf software (eg, see Decision Analysis Software
Survey, http://Lionhrtpub.com/orms/surveys/das/das.
html); (2) a tri-level decision support model to allocate
defensive investments (visible to the attacker) that repre-
sent an attacker’s reasonable response to observing these
preparations, and reactions to any attack with the re-
sources made available by the defensive investments;
and (3) a game-theoretic model of the adversaries that
randomizes expected consequences to capture the vari-
ability of outcomes. These are not mere theoretical sug-
gestions, but rather substantive tools and methods
drawn from extensive research and experience in the
military and in the private sector that can significantly
improve the credibility and usefulness of the BTRA. We
recommend that these 3 techniques (or others that
achieve the same objectives) be developed and evaluated
as soon as possible. Insights from multiple credible
models may be the best way to ensure that homeland se-
curity decision makers have the best available data for
informed decision making.
In their report to the National Research Council, the
Committee has made further detailed and technical recom-
mendations that would improve the BTRA.9 The Commit-
tee hopes DHS will now complete the steps necessary to
produce a robust and reliable risk assessment to meet this
urgent need.
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